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I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 10, 1986, one could almost hear a collective sigh of 
despair arise from the ranks of criminal defense counsel and public 
d-efenders in the state of Indiana. On that day, the Indiana Supreme 
Court handed down White v. State, 1 an opinion that addresses the 
question of what standard should be employed in adjudging a defendant's 
petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty plea was not 
made voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly. Although cases addressing 
this question are too numerous to mention, White differed from many 
of the others because, once again, the supreme court changed the stan-
dard. The White case became the fifth such change in less than ten 
years. The first change occurred in Neeley v. State2 in 1978, followed 
by German v. Stat& in 1981. The Indiana General Assembly then made 
an addition to the guilty plea statute in 1984. 4' The fourth change occurred 
in Austin v. State,5 a supreme court opinion attempting to offset the 
statutory. addition. This lack of consistency in the area of post-conviction 
relief can only lead to an increasingly frustrated criminal bar, particularly 
because the ramifications of White are very problematic given the current 
uncertain application of the law as well as the loose ends created by 
the case itself. 
This Article will, after a brief exposition of pre- White post-conviction 
relief under Indiana law, analyze White v. State as it stands alone and 
will attempt to unravel some of the issues raised by its holding and 
retroactive application. Because of the shifting and varied considerations 
of any single fact situation, the conclusions drawn here are necessarily 
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2269 Ind. 588, 382 N.E.2d 714 (1978). 
3428 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. 1981). 
4See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
5468 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 1984). See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. 
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broad. Indeed, research reveals that there simply is no definitive rule 
of law in the White situation. Consequently, this Article can do nothing 
more than attempt to shed light on a limited number of discrete issues 
defense counsel may wish to consider in their guilty plea practice. 
II. BACKGROUND oF PosT-CoNVICTION RELIEF IN INDIANA 
The genesis of state post-conviction relief is found in three United 
States Supreme Court cases. In Mooney v. Holohan,6 the Supreme Court 
held only that the habeas corpus procedures of California were, standing 
alone, apparently sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of due 
process in giving post-conviction litigants some forum in which to vin-
dicate their claims. 7 Probably b.ecause . of this less than forceful pro-
nouncement, the status of state post-conviction relief remained relatively 
unchanged until Young v. Ragen. 8 In Young, the Court pointed out 
that states are obligated, under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
clause, to give those convicted in state court a clearly defined method 
by which claims alleging denial of a federal constitutional right could 
be litigated. 9 
In 1965; the Court was poised to confront squarely the question of 
whether the lack of a post-conviction remedy was itself a denial of due 
' 
process. The case was set against the backdrop of an increase in the 
number of federal habeas corpus actions. After certiorari was granted 
in Case v. Nebraska, 10 the Nebraska legislature enacted a statewid·e post ... 
conviction procedure. As a result, the Court in Case simply· vacated the 
judgment and remanded for reconsideration under the new Nebraska 
statute. 11 Of particular note is Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, in 
which he delineated some of the characteristics of an appropriate state 
post-conviction procedure. Justice Brennan wrote: 
The procedure should be swift and simple and easily invoked. 
It should be sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all federal 
constitutional claims. . . . [l]t should eschew rigid and technical 
doctrines of forfeiture, waiver or default. It should provide for 
full fact hearings to resolve disputed factual issues, and for 
compilation of a record to enable federal courts to determine 
the sufficiency of those hearings .. It should provide for decisions 
supported by opinions, or fact findings and conclusions of law, 
6294 u.s. 103 (1935). 
7ld. at 113. 
8337 u.s. 235 (1949). 
9/d. at 239. 
10177 Neb. 404. 129 N.W.2d 107, cert. granted 379 U.S. 958 (1965). 
11Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965). 
• 
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which disclose the grounds of decision and the resolution of 
disputed facts. Provision for counsel to represent prisoners . . . 
would enhance the probability of effective presentation and proper 
disposition of prisoners' claims. 12 
87 
Similar themes have been sounded by the American Bar Association13 
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniforn1 State Laws. 14 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform S~ate Laws, in 
its prefatory notes to the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, listed 
the following goals of the act: 
1. A simple and expeditious procedure; 
2. A single procedure obviating the need for state habeas corpus 
or coram nobis proceedings; 
3. Disposition on the merits of the claims whenever possible; 
4. Elimination of subsequent post-conviction petitions by the 
same petitioner CQncerning the same conviction.I5 
In large measure, the Indiana Rules of Post-Conviction Relief are designed 
to effectuate the same goals.16 
Post-conviction relief in Indiana has developed considerably over the 
last 100 years. During the nineteenth century; courts operated und~r the 
premise that a priso~er's word was sufficient to establish guilt. 17 Courts 
~ 
later began to evolve devices for making certain that pleas were not 
induced by threat or coercion but by voluntary and intelligent choice .. 18 
In order to process guilty pleas more systematically, the Indiana General 
11/d. at 346-47 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted)~ Justice Brennan also 
noted that the Nebraska statute was, "plainly an adequate corrective process." /d. 
nSee American Bar ASsociation, Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies, 
§ 4 .. 5 (1967 tentative draft and commentary; American Bar Association, Standards Relating 
to Pleas of Guilty (1967 tentative draft). 
14See UNIF. PosT-CONVICTION PROCEDURE AcT § 1 comment, 11 U.L.A. 233, 234 
(1980). 
15UNIF. PosT CoNVICTION PROCEDURE AcT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 11 U.L.A. 
477, 479-80 (1966), Commissioners' Prefatory Note. 
u~see IND. R. P. POST-CONVICTION. REMEDIES 1 § l(b) (as to unitary remedy); and 
§ 8 (as to single proceeding arising from conviction). 
11Griffith v. State, 36 Ind. 406, 408 (1871). 
"White v. State,, 497 N.E.2d 893, 895 (Ind. 1986). See, e.g., Crooks v. State, 214 
Ind. 505, 15 ·N.E.2d 359 (1938); Myers v. State, 115 Ind. 554, 18 N.E. 42 (1888). Although 
the White opinion does not elaborate on these developments to protect a defendant, they 
include the requirement that the guilty plea be transcribed, that the defendant be informed 
of the ramifications of his guilty plea, and that a route be provided for withdrawing. a 
plea on collateral attack. See IND. R. CRIM. P. 10; State v. Lindsey, 231 Ind. 125, 106 
N.E.2d 230 (1952). 
• 
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Assembly enacted Indiana Code section 35-4.1-1-3,19 setting forth the 
advisements a trial court must make to the pleading defendant, and 
Indiana Code section 35-4.1-1-4,20 specifying the findings a trial court 
must make in order to establish that a defendant has properly entered 
his plea. 21 · 
The first opinion interpreting the requirements set forth in these 
statutory provisions was Neeley v. State. 22 In Neeley, the supreme court 
found the record established that the defendant actually knew about the 
rights he was waiving. Consequently, the court concluded that even 
though the trial judge did not follow the statutory requirements to the 
letter, the defendant, as a result of his knowledge, was not entitled to 
post-conviction relief. 23 
19Section 3 provided: 
. 
The court shall not accept a plea· of guilty from the defendant without first 
addressing the defendant and 
(a) determining that he understands the nature of the charge against him; 
(b) informing him that by his plea of guilty he is admitting the truth of all 
facts alleged in the indictment or information or to an offense included thereunder 
and that upon entry of such plea the court shall proceed with judgment and 
sentence; 
(c) informing him that by his plea of guilty he waives his rights to a public 
and speedy trial by jury, to face the witn~sses against him, to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to require the state to prove 
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant may not 
be compelled to testify against himself; 
(d) informing him of the maximum possible sentenc.e and minimum sentence 
for the offense charged and of any possible increased sentence by reason of 
the fact of a prior conviction or convictions., and of any possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e) informing him that the court is not a party to any agreement which may 
have been made between the prosecutor and the defense and is not bound 
thereby. 
IND. CODE § 35 .. 4.1-1-3 (repealed 1981). 
20Section 4 provided: 
(a) The court shall not accept a, plea of guilty without first personally addressing 
the defendant and determining that the plea is voluntary. The court shall address 
the defendant and determine whether any promises. force or threats were used 
to obtain the plea. 
(b) The court shall not enter judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied 
from its examination of the defendant that there is a factual basis for the plea. 
(c) A plea of guilty shall not be deemed to be involuntary under subsection (a) 
of this section solely because it is the product of an agreement between the 
prosecution and the defense. 
IND. CODE § 35-4.1-1-4 (repealed 1981). 
. 
21Act of Apr. 23, 1973, Pub. L. No. 325, § 4, 1973 Ind. Acts 1750, 1789-90. 
Perhaps, not coincidentally, these statutory provisions were enacted shortly after the bedrock 
guilty plea case of Boykin v. Alabama. 39~ U.S. 238 (1969). 
22269 Ind. 588, 382 N.E.2d 714 (1978). 
23/d. at 595-96, 382 N.E.2d ·at 718. 
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In 1981, the Indiana Supreme Court overruled Neeley in German 
v. State,24 stating that "it is the duty of the trial judge to comply strictly 
with the terms of IND. ConE § 35-4.1-1·3 . . . . '' 25 The court ultimately 
held that the failure of the trial judge to '' [a]ddress the defendant 
according to the requirements and determine that the defendant under~ 
stands the charges against him'' required that the guilty pleas be vacated 
and the matter be tried. 26 
In response to the strict requirement set forth in German, the Indiana 
General Assembly added the following language to Indiana Code section 
35-35-1-2: 27 (c) Any variance from the requirements of this s~ction that 
does not violate a constitutional right of the defendant is not a basis 
for setting aside a plea of guilty. 28 
Such a change "cut at the heart of the German decision, which 
had described the judge's obligation to advise defendants as 'stat-
utory. '"29 In· answer to the legislature's action, the supreme court, in 
Austin v. State, 30 declared the "harmless error" provision set forth in 
Indiana Code section 35-35-1-2(c) a nullity on the premise the advise-
ments set forth in subsection 35:.35-1-2(a)31 are of constitutional dimen-
2A428 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. 1981). 
2' /d. at 236. 
26/d. at 236-37. 
21ln 1981, the legislature repealed sections 35-4.1-1-3 and 35-4.1-1-4 and replaced 
them with sections 35-35-1-3 and 35-35-1-2 respectively. Act of May 5, 1981, Pub. L. 
No. 298, §§ 4, 9, 1981 Ind. Acts 2314, 2366-67, 2391. 
28Act of Feb. 29, 1984, Pub. L. No. 179, § 1, 1984 Ind. Acts 1486, 1487 (codified 
at IND. CoDE § 35-35-l-2(c) (Supp. 1987)). 
29White v. State, 497 N. E. 2d 893, 896 (Ind. 1986) (citing German v. State, 428 
N .E.2d 234, 237 (Ind. 1981)). 
30468 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 1984). 
31This section provides: 
(a) The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill 
at the time of the crime without first determining that the defendant: 
(1) understands the nature of the charge against him; 
(2) has been informed that by his plea he waives his rights to: 
(A) a public and speedy trial by jury; 
(B) confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; 
(C) have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and 
(D) require the. state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial 
at which the defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself; 
(3) has been informed of the maximum possible sentence and minimum sentence 
for the crime charged and any possible increased sentence by reason of the fact 
of a prior conviction or convictions, and any possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; and · 
(4) has been informed that if: 
(A) there is a plea agreement as defined by IC 35-35-3-l; and 
(B) the court accepts the plea; 
the court is bound by the term of the plea agreement. 
IND. CODE § 35-35~ l-2(a) (Supp. 1987). 
• 
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sion.32 This ruling set the stage for the White court's divergence from 
prior law in its interpretation of the statute and of the standard by 
which a trial court's advisements are to be measured. 
III. White v. State, THE CASE 
Randy White pleaded guilty, in September 1981, to charges of bur-
glary and theft and received consecutive sentences of ten and two years, 
respectively. 33 Two years later, White filed a petition for post-conviction 
relief seeking to set his plea aside on the ground that the trial court 
failed to advise him of the possible minimum sentences applicable to 
each charge if he had elected to go to trial rather than to plead guilty. 34 
He claimed the absence of this advisement rendered his plea involuntary, 
unintelligent, and unknowing.35 The trial court denied the petition, and 
White appealed. In an unpublished memorandum opinion,36 the Indiana 
Court of Appeals agreed with White and reversed the trial court, thereby 
giving him the opportunity to withdraw his plea.:n After the denial of 
its rehearing petition,38 the State sought transfer to the supreme court, 
evidently to curb a rising tide of identical post-conviction relief petitions 
presenting the same fatal flaw~39 This time, the State succeeded .. 
32The Austin court stated: 
An accused's entitlement to such advisements, therefore, flows from his due 
process right to be sheltered from the consequences of a guilty plea entered on 
less than an informed judgment and not from the legislative inclusion of it in 
its codification. The legislature may, as a matter of public policy, require 
advisements that are not of such dimension, but it could not eliminate the 
requirements of those essential to an informed judgment, which includes the 
one omitted by the court that accepted the guilty plea. 
468 N.E.2d at 1028. 
33 White, 497 N.E.2d at 894. 
~/d. Post-conviction relief is afforded defendants under Rule 1 of the Indiana Rules 
of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies. 
35497 N.E.2d at 894. In a footnote, the supreme court intimates it may as well 
abandon the "knowingly" element for measuring the validity of a guilty plea: ld. n.l. 
There is a question as to the wisdom of this statement in the face of constitutional 
considerations. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Inasmuch as this statement 
is mere dictum, this Article will continue to adhere to the tripartite terminology. See also 
IND. CODE § 35-35-l-4(c)(3) (Supp. 1987). 
36White v. State, 465 N.E.2d 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). 
3
'White v. State, 465 N.E.2d 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), reh. denied, 484 N.B.2d 82 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985) . 
. 
38484 N .E.2d at 82. 
39£.g., Jones v. State, 478 N.E.2d 676 (Ind. 198.5); Williams v. State, 468 N.E~2d 
1036 (Ind. 1984); Austin v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 1984). 
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The supreme court, comprised of new members since the earlier 
cases involving the same problem, 40 invoked a new standard for reviewing 
guilty pleas: 
A petitioner who claims that his plea was involuntary and un-
intelligent but can only establish that the trial judge failed to 
give an advisement in accordance with § 35-35-1-2 has not met 
his burden of proof. He needs to plead specific facts from which 
a finder of fact could conclude by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the trial judge's failure to make a full inquiry in 
accordance with § 35-35-l-2(a) rendered his decision involuntary 
or unintelligent. Of course, unless the record reveals that the 
defendant knew or was advised at the time of his plea that he 
was waiving his right to a jury trial, his right of confrontation 
and his_ right against self~incrimination; Boykinl411 will require 
that his conviction be vacated.42 
When compared to the standards assumed and discarded through the 
yearsl White,s pro-nouncement obviously instituted a. radical change in 
the method of reviewing a guilty plea on collateral attack. The major 
questions raised by this change are, how and why did the court arrive 
at this new standard? 
First, the White court declared that most of the statutory advisements 
in Indiana Code section 35-35-1~2 lack constitutional foundation, citing 
Boykin v. A/abama.43 This statement is contrary to the Austin decla-
ration.44 The court explains that Boykin identified only three rights of 
' . 
which a defendant need be advised as Inandated by the United States 
• 
Constitution "the_ right to a trial by jury, the right to confront one's 
accusers, and the rig_ht against self-incrimination."45 From this statement, 
the White court concluded that the other advisements in Indiana Code 
' . . 
section 35-35-l-2 are thus not guaranteed by the United States Consti-
tution. By further extrapolation, the opinion also concluded that they 
did not derive from the Indiana Constitution, particularly because the 
words "due process" appear nowhere in it.46 The court then engaged 
40Justices Shepard and Dickson joined the court in 1985 and 1986, respectively, 
replacing Justices Hunter and Prentice who voted in the majority in Jones v. State, 478 
N.E.2d 676 (Ind. 1985); Williams v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1036 (Ind. 1984); and Austin v. 
State, 468 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 1984). 
·UBoykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
41 White, 497 N .E.2d at 905-. 
43395 u.s. 218 (1969). 
44497 N .E.2d at 897. 
•~!d. 
46[d. 
• 
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in a circuitous discussion refuting the rationale of Austin v. State, done 
apparently in order to undermine the Austin court's declaration that the 
German standard of strict adherence to the statutory procedure is un-
disputedly a province of the courts alone because of its constitutional 
dimensions and is therefore outside the realm of the legislature's ''harm-
less error" codification.47 Having thereby "weakened" the German stan-
dard, the White court continued in this vein to what appears to be the 
true purpose of the opinion a criticism of the application of the strict 
German-Austin review. 
The court acknowledged the ease with which German can be applied 
by ''being easy (o remember and easy to apply.''48 The court then set 
forth the disadvantages to its application: common sense dictates that 
some of the trial court's omissions are harmless, and post-conviction 
relief proceedings are being abused by defendants who are exercising 
their rights on the basis of these picayune errors.49 In search of an 
alternative to the German ''prophylactic'' rule, the supreme court turned 
to the federal courts for guidance for a more appropriate standard. 
The White opinion noted the fundamental inquiries federal courts 
. 
have made into the voluntary, knowing and intelligent basis for a de-
fendant's plea. For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
United States v. Wetterlin,so looked to the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the plea to determine whether the defendant understood his 
rights. 51 This issue was framed in Hill v. United States5z as, ''Was the 
error in the proceeding a fundamental defect which inherently results 
in a complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with 
the rudimentary demands of fair procedure?'' 53 The White opinion makes 
• • 
clear that these formulations of the fundamental issue arose in a context 
similar to that of German and Austin-.. ··the impact of a "statutory" list 
of advisements. 
In the federal courts, however, this list of advisements takes the 
form of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.54 Starting 
'"/d. at 897-900. See Austin, 468 N.E.2d at 1028-29. See also supra notes 27-32 and 
accompanying text. , 
"'White, 497 N.E.2d at 900. 
49fd. 
50583 F .2d 346, 354 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.· denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1979). 
'
1497 N.E.2d at 902. 
52368 U.s. 424 (1962). 
'
53 White, 497 N.E.2d at 902 (citing Hill, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). 
'"FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. Rule 11 (c) provides: 
(c) Advice to the Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, 
the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him 
of, and d~termine that he understands, the following: 
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory 
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with McCarthy v. United States,ss in which the United States Supreme 
Court declared that a failure to comply with an early version of Rule 
11 mandate·d vacation of a plea on direct appeal, the federal circuit 
courts eventually reached a German-like conclusion that, under an amended 
version of Rule 11, any violation of the rule was per se prejudicial even 
on collateral attack.56 However, the Supreme Court, in United States v. 
Timmreck, 51 wholeheartedly rejected that conclusion where the trial court 
had failed to inform a defendant of a mandatory special parole term. 
The Court declared that where, as in Timmreck, the trial court has 
committed only a violation of Rule 11 's "formal" requirements, collateral 
relief from a guilty plea was not available.58 In the context of Timmreck's 
holding, the White court cites to various situations where other federal 
courts have come to similar conclusions, by requiring a defendant to 
show prejudice,59 by declaring that reality rather than ritual must govern 
review /J(} or by finding the lack of a certain advisement is harmless 
error. 61 Rounding out its discussion and reaching its ultimate conclusion, 
as set forth previously, the White opinion quoted from a recent case 
from the Supreme Court, United States v. Mechanik,62 which denounced 
• 
minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible 
penalty provided by law, including the effect of any special parole 
term and, when applicable, that the court may also order the defendant 
to make restitution to any victim of the offense; and 
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has 
the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the 
. . 
proceeding against him and if necessary, one will be appointed to 
' 
represent him; and 
(3) that he had the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea 
if it has already been made, and he has the right to be tried by a 
jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the 
right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; and 
(4) that if his plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted by the 
court there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading 
guilty or nolo· contendere he waives the right to a trial; and 
(5) if the court intends to question the defendant under oath, on the 
record, and in the presence of counsel abo\lt the offense to which he 
has pleaded, that his answers may later be used against him in a 
prosecution for perjury or false statement. 
55394 u.s. 459 (1969). 
'
6See, e.g., Timmreck v. United States, 577 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd 441 U.S. 
780 (1979). 
57441 u.s. 780 (1979). 
58/d. at 785. 
59497 N.E.2d at 904 (citing United States v. Caston, 615 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
6l>Jd. (citing United States v. Frazier, 705 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
6lfd. (citing United States v. Stead1 748 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1984)). 
62475 u.s. 66 (1986). 
94 INDIANA LAW REVIEW 
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the cost to ~ociety created by retrials as well as their detrimental effect 
upon the criminal justice system.63 
Armed with these precedents the United States Supreme Court 
denunciation of new trials and its own newly formulated standard the 
Indiana Supreme Court applied its new declaration to Randy White's 
petition and found that petition wanting. The court's review of the 
transcript revealed that White had made no other case for withdrawal 
of his plea beyond the mere assertion that the trial court failed to make 
the single advisement set forth in Indiana Code section 35-35-l-2(a) 
regarding minimum sentencing.64 White presented no facts to show he 
indeed did not know what the minimum sentences were nor had he 
alleged any other facts indicating his guilty plea was anything but in-
telligent, voluntary and knowing. Specifically, White did not claim that 
but for the trial court's error he would have decided to go to trial 
rather than to plead guilty.65 Therefore, the supreme court concluded, 
Randy White had not borne his burden of showing by a preponderance 
of the evidence that his petition for post-conviction relief should have 
been granted and his plea withdrawn. 66 
IV. EvALUATION OF White 
Upon preliminary analysis of White, one's first instinct is to dismiss 
it as incorrect on the basis of its flawed foundation and strained logic. 
The federal case law cited by the court vacillates from standard to 
standard, none of which the White court ever really adopted. In addition, 
the opinion made no distinction between cases decided on direct appeal, 
such as in McCarthy v. United States, 67 and cases decided on collateral 
attack, such as United States v. Timmreck.68 Ultimately, this distinction 
is of little moment, but it casts an additional cloud on an opinion that 
also relied on the rationale of a case that did not involve a guilty plea 
at all, United States v. Mechanik.69 These minor problems aside, one 
is further confronted with the decision's strained efforts to substantiate 
its credibility by attacking the Austin v. State70 and German v. State71 
• • optntons. 
63 White, 497 N.E.2d at 905. 
6AJd. at 906. See supra note 31. 
65497 N .E.2d at 906. 
MJd. 
67394 u.s. 459 (1969). 
68441 u.s. 780 .(1979). 
69475 u.s. 66 (1986). 
70468 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 1984). 
7l428 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. 1981). 
• 
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A. White's Interpretation of Austin and Gertnan and its Effect 
• 
To reiterate briefly, the Indiana Supreme Court in German held that 
the then-extant advisement statute, Indiana Code section 35-4.1-1-3,72 
mandated strict compliance by a trial court, 73 in order to determine that 
a guilty plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. As to 
the specific facts involved in German, this de.cision meant that advisements 
present in a written plea agreement were inadequate. 74 Considering the 
mandatory language of the statute ''The court shall not a~cept a plea 
of guilty from the defendant without first addressing the defendant"75-
this result seems only logicaL This wording is not discretionary, and the 
German holding is akin to the result the United States Supreme Court 
reached in McCarthy v. United States,16 a case of direct appeal from 
a trial court's failure to follow Federal Rule 11. Shortly after German, 
and probably as its logical consequence, the In4iana legislature passed 
into law an amended advisement statute that includes mandatory language77 
similar to the earlier version but also adds the following: ''Any variance 
from the ~equirements of this section that does not violate a constitutional 
right of the defendant is not a basis for setting aside a plea of guilty. " 78 
As a response to that enactment, the Indiana Supreme Court declared 
the new provision a nullity in Austin.79 Although the White court intimates 
the Austin court backed away from its German rationale of strict con-
struction of the mandatory language of the statute in order to pronounce 
a new rationale, 80 a careful reading shows the White court misconstrued 
Austin. 
Austin stated that strict construction of the mandatory language is 
a reason for requiring strict compliance with the advisement. However; 
72See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text. 
11
"We hold that it is the duty of the trial judge to comply strictly with the terms 
of IND. CoDE § 35-4.1-1-3. . .. " 428 N.E.2d at 236. 
74/d. 
75 See supra note 19. 
76394 U.S. 459 (1969). The Supreme Court declared: 
[W]e hold that a defendant is entitled to plead anew if a United States district 
court accepts his guilty plea without fully adhering to the procedure provided 
for in Rule 11. This decision is based solely upon our construction of Rule 11 
and is made pursuant to our supervisory power over the lower federal courts; 
we do not reach any of the constitutional arguments petitioner urges as additional 
grounds for reversal. 
/d. at 463-64. 
77"Th~ court shall not accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill at the time 
of the crime, without first detenuining that the defendant ... , IND. CODE § 35-35-1-
2(a) (Supp. 1987). 
18/d. § 35-35-I-2(c). 
79468 N.E.2d 1027, 1029 (Ind. 1984). 
80497 N.E.2d 893, 899 (Ind. 1986). 
• 
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it is not the only reason. 81 Not having had reason to reach the consti-
tutional issue prior to that time as courts are wont to do82 the A us tin 
court plucked up its courage and did just that.. In holding that Dotsie 
Austin was entitled to an advisement of his minimum possible sentences, 
the court stated: 
An understanding of the range of possible sentences is, among 
other factors, essential to an informed judgment as to whether 
or not to enter a guilty plea. This is self-evident. An accused,s 
entitlement to such advisements, therefore, flows from his due 
process right to be sheltered from the consequences of a guilty 
plea entered on less than an informed judgment and not from 
the legislative inclusion of it in its codification. The legislature 
may, as a matter of public policy, require advisements that are 
. 
not of such dimension, but it could not eliminate the requirements 
of those essential to an informed judgment, which includes the 
one omitted by the court that accepted the guilty plea.83 
The Austin court further found the· legislature's harmless error provision 
in Indiana Code section 35-35-1-2(c) a nullity for a second reason the 
harmless error doctrine is within the exclusive domain of the courts and 
therefore outside the domain of the legislature. 84 The White court at-
tempted to tear this reasoning apart. 
• 
First, the White opinion interpreted the Austin court's "due process" 
right as being the bundle of advisements given to a defendant, then 
went on to show that not all those rights are afforded by· the Consti-
tution. 85 To the extent that not all these advisements are explicitly within 
the federal Constitution, the White court is correct. 86 After reaching this 
conclusion, the court also declared that the Indiana Constitution does 
not offer this "due process" right either. The court then explained how 
the Austin court's misapprehension of due process makes the opinion 
''not fully reliable.' ' 87 The White court made one fundamental error in 
its analysis. It failed to consider the full Austin pronouncement that 
"(a]n accused's entitlement to such advisement ... flows from his due 
process right . ... " 88 
It is a basic tenet of criminal law that a guilty plea must be voluntary, 
knowing and intelligent; otherwise it has been obtained in violation of 
81468 N .E.2d at 1028. 
82See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1979). 
13468 N.E.2d at 1028 (Emphasis added). 
~Id. at 1029. 
8
'497 N.E.2d at 897. 
86See infra notes, 118-22 and accompanying text. 
87497 N .E.2d at 898. 
88468 N.E.2d at 1028 (Emphasis added). 
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the individual's due process rights.89 The White court missed the point 
when it focused on the discrete advisements. It is the ''waiver of . . . 
'a known right or privilege'' '90 that is the constitutionally protected right 
with which Austin was concerned. The Austin court's decision to require, 
on due process grounds, an advisement of the minimum sentencing a 
defendant may be waiving in order to engender a proper plea was within 
its prerogative to interpret constitutional law and was within the bounds 
of dicta pronounced by Boykin v. Alabama.91 Similarly, the White court's 
decision that due process was not better served by requiring this ad-
visement waiving a right not explicitly set forth in the Constitution was 
its prerogative. It would have been much simpler to just say so, rather 
than to find a flaw in Austin, because there is adequate precedent for 
White'·s reasoning.: 
The primary fact in White that must be remembered is that it 
concerned a collateral attack on a guilty plea, vis-a ... vis a petition for 
post-conviction relief, not a direct appeaL The extent to which the White 
court recognized this fact exists in its citation to federal cases concerned 
with collateral attacks on pleas.92 As the White case indicates and in-
dependent research reveals, there is no single method of approaching 
review of a guilty plea on collateral attack, be it by habeas corpus, 
• 
motion to vacate sentence93 or a petition for post ... cortviction relief. 
Traditionally; collateral attack on a guilty plea in the federal system 
requires a showing of a constitutional or jurisdictional defect rendering 
the judgment void, "a fundamental defect which inherently results in 
a complete miscarriage of justice, [or] an omission inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of fair procedure.' '94 The translation to an Indiana 
post-conviction procedure framework is found generally in the rules for 
post-conviction remedies: 
89See, e.g., Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 ( 1976); Boy kin v. Alabama; 
395 U.S. 238, 243 n.S (1969); McCarthy v~ United States, 394 U.S. 4;59, 466 .(1969). 
90McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
. . . 
91 A majority of criminal convictions are obtained after a plea of guilty. If 
these convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial court is best advised 
to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include, 
inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature 
of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the 
0 
offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences. Com-. 
. 
monwealth ex rei. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 105-06, 237 A.2d 196, 197-98 
(1968). 
395 U.S. at 244 n.7 (Emphasis added). 
92E.g.; United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1978); Hill v. United States, 368 
u.s. 424 (1962). { 
9328 U .S.C. § 2255 (1982). 
94Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. at 428; United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 
783. 
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(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, 
a crime by a court of this state, and who claims: 
(1) that the conviction or the- sentence was in violation of 
the Constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws 
of this state; 
(2) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; 
.. . . 
(6) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to 
col~ateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore 
available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, 
petition, p-roceeding or remedy; 
may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure 
relief.95 
In the specific context of a collateral attack on a guilty plea, the goal 
is to determine whether the defendant entered his plea voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently,96 as a matter of due process.97 The entry 
of conviction upon a plea not so entered is fundamental error,98 thereby 
creating justification for reversal by collateral attack. The major con-
tention is what process is due to a guilty plea petitioner: what must a 
guilty plea defendant know in order to make a voluntary choice of 
pleading guilty rather than the alternative of standing trial?99 
In Indiana,_ the legislature has determined a statutory framework, 
as discussed above, within which a trial court must work in order to 
satisfy itself that the guilty plea defendant has been accorded his due 
process rights. 100 Basically, these statutes require a trial court to assure 
itself that an unrepresented defendant has knowingly waived his right 
to counsel, 101 that there is a factual basis for the plea, 102 that the plea 
was not induced by promises, threats or force, 103 that the defendant 
understands the nature of the charge against him, 104 and that he waives 
certain rights and sentencing alternatives that might otherwise be available 
to him. 10s Unfortunately, despite the ease with which a trial court and 
9siND. R. P. PosT-CoNVICTION REMEDIEs 1 §' 1. 
96Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644·45 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238, 243 (1964); Davis v. State, 446 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (Ind. 1983); Brown v. State, 435 
N.E.2d 582, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
91Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647. · 
98Brown, 435 N .E.2d at 584. 
99North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). 
100See suprQ note 31 and accompanying text. 
101 IND. ConE § 35·35·1·1 (Supp. 1987). 
102IND. CODE § 35-35-1-3 (Supp. 1987). 
103IND. ConE- § 35-35-l-3(a) (Supp. 1987). 
104IND. CODE § 3S-35-1-2(a)(l) (Supp. 1987). 
105IND. CODE § 35-35-l-2(a)(2) (Supp. 1987). 
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a prosecutor could follow these steps, many pleas have been accepted 
without compliance with them, the White case being just one example 
of many. German and Austin provided one answer to these errors by 
mandating strict compliance with the statutes.106 White provides another 
by implying the statutes incorrectly call for more from trial courts than 
due process requires. 107 
One must remember that, after all is said and done, the interpretation 
• 
of the Constitution is the sole province of the. courts. 108 Regardless of 
how the legislature may interpret it, the courts remain the final arbiters 
of its construction and~ .th~s, of adjudging a guilty plea defendant's 
rights to due process. To. that end, the White court has declared that 
certain portions of the statutes are immutably required by due process: 
"[U]nless the record reveals that the defendant knew or was advised at 
the time of his plea that he was waiving his right to a jury trial, his 
right of confrontation and his right against self incrimination, Boykin 
will require that his conviction be vacated,'' or if the plea is entered 
"after coercion, judicial or otherwise." 109 The absence of . the other 
legislative requirements from a guilty plea record, such as the advisement 
of Randy White's minimum possible sentence, is relegated to the fuzzy 
zone of "colorable claims for relief"110 upon which a petitioner may 
prevail only by showing, by a preponderance of evidence, that he has 
actually been misled in choosing to plead guilty over his alternatives. 111 
To the extent that this conclusion conforms to accepted procedures on 
• 
post-conviction relief, the Indiana Supreme court appears to be correct. 
However, insofar as White purports to reflect a proper standard of 
attacking a guilty plea, it is incorrect. 
The issue ultimately is whether the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, 
and intelligently elected to plead guilty. Therefore, the inquiry should 
be whether, given the evidence in the record at the post-conviction 
proceeding, the petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he was not accorded due process. To put the onus on the petitioner 
at the post-conviction proceeding to show he w~s actually misled, as 
White requires, is to further relieve the trial court and the prosecution 
from est(!blishing an adequate record of the plea proceedings as mandated 
by Boykin and its collateral attack progeny. 112 Certainly, a defendant's 
having been misled could be part of the evidence establishing the lack 
1()6See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text. 
107497 N.E.2d at 897. 
108Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 107, 155 N.E. 465, 469 (1927). 
uw497 N. E .2d at 905. 
110/d. at 9(}6, 
Ill /d. 
112See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. 
• 
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. 
of voluntariness and intelligence of his plea. But to make this single 
inquiry, in addition to the four immutable requirements set forth above, 113 
runs contrary to the clear message of Boykin. 
This procedural distinction is, of course, merely an intellectual di-
version, when in fact the issue in White is whether the trial court's 
failure to follow the statute is essentially harmless error .114 In other 
words, is the absence of an advisement of a minimum possible sentence 
a denial of due process? Although a liberal and well-devised opinion 
from the Indiana Court of Appeals has described all the statutory 
provisions as of constitutional dimension, 115 the fact remains that the 
Indiana Supreme Court, as the highest court in the state, is the final 
authority in this state on the parameters of due process set forth in 
both the state and federal constitutions. In White, the supreme court 
simply disagreed with the court of appeals and implicit~y declared that, 
given the facts of Randy White's case, the error in failing to· advise 
him of his minimum possible sentence was not of constitutional dimension 
vis-a-vis due process. The trial court's error was not sufficient to afford 
White °Collateral relief. 116 
. 
This result on the basis of harmless error and lack of prejudice has 
sufficient precedent, 117 even if White's underlying rationale does not. 
What remains to be seen is White's application in instances of other 
omissions from the statutory advisements. 
B. The Advisements Required by Due Process 
The White court set forth four advisements and/or inquiries ab-
solutely mandated by due process. They are advisement of a defendant's 
waiver of his right to a jury trial, his right of confrontation, and his 
right against self-incrimination and, impliedly, an inquiry as to whether 
the plea has been coerced. 118 The three advisements of waiver were borne 
of the federal Constitution and are explicitly set forth in Boykin v. 
Alabama. 119 The absence of any of these advisements in a plea proceeding 
is a clear violation of due process, thereby voiding the conviction based 
113See supra text accompanying note 109. 
114See White, 497 N.E.2d at 905. See also United States v. Timmreck, 441 U~S. 780, 
783 (1978) ("Such a violation is neither constitutional nor jurisdictional."); Hill v. U.S., 
368 u.s. 424, 428 (1962). 
11~Jones v. State, 467 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). 
"
6 White, 497 N.E.2d at 905-06. 
117E.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 42 (1985); United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 
at 783. 
118See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
119395 U.S. at 243. See also McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). 
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thereon. 120 The inquiry into whether a defendant has been coerced is 
the implied converse of an inquiry into voluntariness. This, too, has 
been deemed essential to due process in Brady v. United States. 121 The 
Indiana statutes require certain other advisements not set forth in White.• 22 
Some of them should have been listed in White as evocative of due 
process; others were rightfully omitted, insofar as White applies only 
to collateral proceedings. · 
Evidently, Randy White appeared at his plea proceeding with counsel; 
therefore, the advisement of waiver providing that "[a] plea of guilty 
. . . shall not be accepted from a defendant unrepresented by counsel 
who has not freely and knowingly waived his right to counsel'' was not 
at issue. 123 Rice v. 0/son•'-4_ elevated the knowing waiver of this consti-
tutional right to the status of an element of due process in the guilty 
plea setting. Although the White scenario did not need to address this 
matter, the case's reliance on the Boykin factors as being absolute rights 
leads to the conclusion that if the matter should arise in the proper 
situation, the Indiana Supreme Court would find prima facie reversible 
error in the absence of waiver of counsel. 
Another element not addressed by White but still undeniably an 
element of due process in the guilty plea proceeding is whether the 
defendant '·'understands the nature of the charge against him." 12' It was 
early established in Smith v. O,Grady126 that a defendant must understand 
the nature of the charge against him before he can voluntarily and 
intelligently plead guilty. The Supreme Court later applied this require-
ment to collateral attacks in Henderson v. Morgan. 121 Under the cir-
cumstances, the Indiana Supreme Court can do no less than recognize 
this factor also, despite its omission from the list in White. The con--
stitutional mandate interpreted by the United States Supreme Court 
demands it. 
. . 
One advisement in Indiana Code section 35-35 ... 1-2 that has not yet 
been treated as of constitutional dimension in the guilty plea setting is 
the waiver of a "public and speedy trial by jury. " 128 Barker v. Wingo 129 
u.oBoykin, 395 U.S. at 243. 
t::a397 l).S. 742 (1970). 
rnsee supra note 31 and accom.panying text. 
11liND. CODE § 35 .. 35-1-1 (Supp. 1987). 
I2AJ24 u.s. 786, 791 (1945). 
115IND. CoDE § 35-35-1-2(a)(l) (Supp. 1987). Closely associated with this determination 
is the element requiring that "[t)he court shall not enter judgment upon a plea of guilty 
. . . unless it is satisfied from its examination of the defendant or the evidence presented 
that there is a factual basis for the plea.', IND. ConE § 35·35-1-J(b) (Supp .. 1987). 
126312 u.s. 329, 334 (1941). 
12
'426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
111IND. CoDE § 35-35-1-2(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1987). 
129407 u.s. 514, 515-16 (1.972). 
• 
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clearly established a state court defendant's right to a speedy trial under 
the Sixth Amendment; sound policy supports the argument in favor of 
raising this right to the status of the Boykin rights. 13° For example, 
many defendants do not make bail and must remain incarcerated in 
local jails until trial and sentencing. Notoriously, these local jails even 
in rural areas present such awful conditions that a defendant would 
willingly plead guilty to gain transport to a perhaps le~s troublesome 
facility. A defendant would surely want to know that ·a speedy trial is 
available to him in order for him to make an informed choice whether 
to plead guilty or to wait shortly for a trial. However, until the United 
States Supreme Court adopts the position that the right to a speedy 
trial is constitutionally mandated in the due process waiver of a pleading 
defendant, it is highly unlikely, as evidenced by White, that the Indiana 
Supreme Court will take such a position. 131 Additionally, one could argue 
that a defendant could infer his right to a speedy trial by the speed 
with which the state will allow him to plead guilty. 
The next advisement of Indiana Code section 35-35-] ... 2, and the 
primary subject of White; is the advis.ement of the minimum and max-
imum sentences and the possibility of increased or consecutive sentences. 132 
The Boykin majority alluded to the constitutional dimension of this 
generic advisement in dictum when it cited to a state court opinion: 
''the trial court is best advised to conduct an on the record examination 
of the defendant which should include . . . the permissible range of 
sentences." 133 However, in the absence of actually misleading a defendant 
into pleading guilty because of his misunderstanding of the possible 
sentences, u 4 the failure to make this advisement is usually relegated to 
a designation as a technical violation only .135 The usefulness of further 
130See the dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Johnson v. Ohio, 
4'19 U.S. 924 (1974). Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, states 
that enumeration in Boykin is "illustrative, not exhaustive" and should therefore include 
the right to a speedy trial. 419 U.S. at 926 (Douglas, J ., dissenting). 
131 However, the Indiana Supreme Court, relying on the holding of German v. State, 
428 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. 1981), held that on a petition for post-conviction relief, a defendant's 
plea of guilty would be vacated where the trial judge accepting sucb plea failed to inform 
the defendant that by so pleading. he was thereby waiving his right to a speedy trial. 
Hayenga v. State, 463 N.E.2d 1383, 1384 (Ind. 1984). 
132lND. CooE § 35-35-l-2(a)(3) (Supp. 1987). 
1338oykin v. Alabama, 39S U.S. at 244 n.7 (1969) (quoting Commonwealth ex rei. 
West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 105-06, 237 A.2d 196, 197-98 (1968)). 
134See, e.g., United States v. Sharon, 812 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1987) (special parole 
not described); United States v. Hawthorne, 806 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1986) (failure to inform 
of imposition of restitution). 
135See, e.g., United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979). See also Hill v. Lockhart, 
• 474 u.s. 52 (1985). 
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argument that this advisement is paramount to a defendant's ~ue process 
rights is minimal. 
The final element set forth in the Indiana statutes declares that if 
a trial court accepts a plea premised upon an agreement, the court is 
bound by the terms of that agreement. 136 As a practical matter, this 
information is essentially superfluous. Why would a defendant choose 
to enter into a plea agreement if he did not fully intend to get what 
he bargained for? This information probably has little to do with any 
due process rights but is merely a vestige of the prior adviseme~t that 
a trial court was not bound by any plea agreements. 137 The failure to 
make this earlier advisement was a violation of due process. 138 Under 
the current version of the statute this advisement has little actual value 
for purposes of establishing grounds for collateral attack. 
Although the foregoing elements were established by the Indiana 
legislature and do not all have per se constitutional derivation, most of 
the factors do have precedential force from the federal courts in their 
interpretation of the United States Constitution by reason of the Four-
teenth Amendment139 as well as by direct mandate from the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 140 Of course, not only are states bound 
by the Constitution in their interpretation of constitutional rights, par-
ticularly those of due process, but they may also re.quire a higher standard .. 
Inasmuch as the Indiana Supreme Court has impliedly declared in White 
that the General Assembly will not govern the definition of due process 
in creating a higher standard than that required of federal courts, the 
question remains whether there exists anything else which is inherent in 
due process which the supreme court may also have ignored. 
The Indiana Constitution has been oft-neglected in the consideration 
of a pleading defendant's due process rights. Two sections are of par-
ticular application in such a case: 
All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done 
to him in his person, property, or reputation shall have remedy 
by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and 
without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and 
u6IND. ConE § 35·35-l-2(a)(4) (Supp. 1987). 
137IND. ConE § 35-4.1-l-3(e) (repealed 1981). 
131See, e.g., Pharms v. State, 477 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
139See, e.g., Robbins v. State, 251 Ind. 313, 321, 241 N.E.2d 148, 153 (1968). For 
federal cases involving state court defendant, see, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 244 
(1969); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976). · 
140
"No person shall . . • be deprived of life; liberty or property, without due process 
of law ... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. For two examples of federal defendants, see McCarthy 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) and United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 
(1979). However, both of these cases focused upon FEn. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
• 
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without delay . 141 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right 
to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county in which 
the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by himself 
and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses 
face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor. 142 
The combined meaning of these two provisions tracks fairly closely with 
the same rights set forth above and interpreted within the United States 
Constitution.143 The state rights identical to the federal rights ·would 
receive similar application by the supreme court. For example, the state 
right to jury trial must be announced to a pleading defendant.144 On 
the other hand, there seems little doubt that as to the interpretation of 
the federal right to a speedy and public trialt the Indiana Supreme Court 
would treat the same state constitutional provision with like regard ... That 
is, such a right is not within the meaning of due process. 145 It does not 
appear, from the tenor of White, that the supreme court will expand 
the- Indiana Constitution's Hdue course of law"' beyond that prescribed 
for the ·united States Constitution's "due process of law." 146 However, 
there is one very serious deficiency in Indiana's criminal procedure which 
either will have to actually be rectified or must also be included in a 
pleading defendant's advisement: the right to a direct appeal. 
The Indiana Constitution has been interpreted and applied by Indiana 
courts as giving criminal defendants the right to appeaL 147 Although 
there is contradictory authority on the issue, 148 the most recent statement 
on the matter appears in Judy v. State. 149 In that case the supreme court 
reviewed Steven Judy's waiver of his right to appeal his death penalty 
case-. Acknowledging that review of the death penalty phase itself was 
not waiveable, the court declared that Judy's waiver of his right to 
141IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12. 
•
4iJd. at § 13. 
143See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text . 
... See supra notes 31 and accompanying text. 
145See supra notes 128·31 and accompanying text. 
146See White, 497 N.E.2d at 897 n.4, and cases cited therein ("due process·" is 
interchangeable with ' ' due course"). 
141See Judy v. State~ 275 Ind. 145, 157, 416 N.E.2d 95., 101 (1981); Peterson v. State, 
246 Ind. 452, 456, 206 N.E.2d 371, 372 (1965); Woods v. State, 426 N.E.2d 107 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1981); see also IND. Cons § 35-3.8-4-l (Supp. 1987). 
148See, e.g., Robbins v. State, 251 Ind. 323, 325, 242 N.E.2d 925, 927 (1969); In re 
Pisello, 155 Ind. App. 484, 488, 293 N.E.2d 228, 230 (1973). 
149275 Ind. 145, 416 N.E.2d 95 (1981). 
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appeal his conviction must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary .150 
Although the court declared in an earlier case, Riner v. Raines, 151 that 
the right to appeal a criminal conviction is not a necessary element of 
due process, 152 the Jur;Jy decision belies that interpretation. This issue 
would ordinarily be of no moment but for the fact that pleading de-
fendants are typically confined to challenging their pleas by collateral 
attack· . rather than by direct appeal. 
For reasons that are unclear, in the eatly 1980's the Indiana appellate 
courts began ruling that a criminal defendant could not attack his plea 
by a motion to correct error and direct appeal. 153 Evidently, these holdings 
express the courts' beliefs that the language in the Indiana Rules of 
Civil Procedure and of Criminal Procedure pertaining to the appeal 
from judgments referring directly to "trial," "verdict," or "decision," 154 
should be interpreted to preclude those instances where one pleads guilty 
rather than proceeds to trial. It is difficult to understand these holdings, 
however, in light of the clearly constitutional dimensions of the right, 
and the language of Indiana Code section 35-38-4-l(a): An appeal to 
the supreme court or the court of appeals may be taken by the defendant: 
(1) as a matter of right from any judgment in a criminal action; and 
(2) in accordance with this chapter. 155 
A plea by a criminal defendant is just as much a conviction as if 
he had gone to trial. 156 Furthermore, the rule for post-conviction relief 
affords guilty plea defendants the opportunity to file a belated appeal. 157 
It is therefore perplexing why attacks on guilty pleas are reduced to the 
realm of petitions for post-conviction relief. 
This examination of the law leads to the inevitable conclusions that 
the appellate courts are wrong and that the law does afford pleading 
defendants the opportunity to appeal,. or that the law actually does not 
afford this right. In either circumstance, the law is ~qually clear that 
if defendants convicted after trial do have the right, but defendants 
convicted after pleading do not, then the pleading defendants are being 
denied their rights under equal protection of the law .us Although the 
lSOJd. at 150, 416 N.E.2d at 97 (emphasis added). 
i"274 Ind. 113, 409 N.E.2d 575 (1980). 
u 2Jd. at 118, 409 N.E.2d at 578. 
1
'
3See, e.g., Stone v. State, 444 N.E.2d 1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Woods v. State, 
426 N .E.2d 107 (Ind. 1981). 
154See IND. R. CIV. P. 59. 
"'IND. ConE § 35-38-4-1 (Supp. 1987). 
'"See, e.g., Boy kin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
u'IND. R. P. PosT-CONVICTION REMEDIES 2 § l provides: "Any defendant convicted 
after a trial_or plea of guilty may petition the court of conviction for permission to file 
a belated motion for new trial ... " 
u•''No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person 
within its judsdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNST. amend XIV, § 1. 
• 
106 INDIANA LAW REVIEW (Vol. 21:85 
initial premise of the following statement regarding due proce$s is flawed 
in the wake of Judy, it is hard to deny the_ ultimate import of this 
declaration by the Indiana Supreme Court: ''[T]he right to appeal i~ 
criminal cases is not a necessary element of due process although to the 
extent that a state provides such a right, the equal protection clause 
would require all affected to be treated alike." 159 Thus, this right is 
elevated to a federal due process issue, and the failure of the Indiana 
courts to advise of this right is reversible error. 
Two options are open to cure this serious flaw in the system. The 
ideal solution would be for the courts to interpret the Indiana Constitution 
to include the right to appeal and thereafter to apply such a right equally 
among defendants. The second option would be for the General Assembly 
to amend the appropriate statutes and trial rules to invoke clearly this 
due process right to pleading defendants. Merely to advise a pleading 
defendant that by pleading guilty he waives the right to appeal because 
this right concerns the procedure surrounding the plea is not an option. 
Rather, a pleading defendant must be informed of his right to a direct 
appeal which may- be waived if such waiver is voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent. 160-
The ramifications of properly inserting this right in the matter of 
due process may have little or no practical effect on current procedure. 
It is fairly common knowledge that most attacks on guilty pleas fall 
outside the limitations for a direct appeal, either with respect to the 
passage of time161 or as a substantive matter of the belated appeals-
requirements.162 Collateral attacks are typically lodged when a defendant 
discovers he may be charged as an habitual offender163 if he cannot 
avoid an earlier guilty plea conviction. The absence of an advisement 
regarding the defendant's right to appeal constitutes fundamental error 
as a denial of equal protection under the law. Failure of a trial court 
to make a record of this right ranks with a similar failure to make the 
Boykin advisements in mandating reversal. Futhermore, the effect on 
the possibilities open to defendants who can timely perfect an appeal 
could be enormous because McCarthy v. United States164 clearly mandates 
reversal for any omission fro.m the federal guilty plea statutes if brought 
on direct appeal .. 
' 
159Riner v. Raines, 274 Ind. 113, 118, 409 N .E.2d 575, 578 (1980) (emphasis added). 
160But see United States v. Frazier. 705 F .2d -903. 908 n.8 (7th Cir. 1983) (in which 
the opinion appears to deal with the right to appeal a related motion to suppress, but 
uses unfortunately broad language such that it could be construed as the right to appeal 
the plea). 
161IND. R. CIV. p. 59. 
162IND. R. P. PosT-CoNVICTION REMEDIES 2. 
163lND. CoDE § 35-50..2-8 (Supp. 1987). 
164394 U.S., 4S9. 463-64 (1969). 
• 
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Although it addresses the construction of the federal rule and its 
specific terms, the import of the McCarthy opinion is that an appealing 
defendant should not have to bear the burden of disproving the vol-
untariness of his plea. Rather, all resort to fact ... finding is eliminated 
and the court must determine error on the plea record alone. 165 Omissions 
are prima facie reversible error. The same result would be particularly 
appropriate in Indiana where the motion to correct error does not 
contemplate additional fact-finding after judgment, except for newly 
.. 
discovered evidence.166 
The problem that continues to fester in all this, of course, is the 
effect of the recent statutory amendment providing: ''Any variance from 
the requirements of this section that does not violate a constitutional 
right of the defendant is not a basis for setting aside a plea of guilty.'' 167 
Can the courts apply this "harmless error'' standard to get around the 
mandate of McCarthy v. United States? 168 
A differently composed Indiana Supreme Court concluded, in Austin 
v. State, 169 that the .General Assembly "may not fetter the judiciary with 
its concept of harmless error'' 170 and declared Indiana Code section 35-
33-1-2(c) a nullity. Although criticized heartily by the White court, 171 
Austin was without doubt correct in this regard. The due process accorded 
to pleading defendants is, by and large, governed by the advisement of 
waiver of federal constitutional rights. This advisement procedure itself 
emanates from the Constitution. In most respects then, the ''harmless 
error'' provision is an empty vessel it applies to virtually nothing raised 
in the statutes. The "harmless error'' provision is also of no moment 
in light of the clear import of the language of the Supreme Court in 
Chapman v. Ca/ifornia172 when it addressed a state constitutional pro-
vision undercutting a federal constitutional right: "With faithfulness to 
the constitutional union of the states, we cannot leave to the States the 
1
''JrGi. ~t ~~-
1661ND. R. CIV. P. 59(A)(6). 
"'IND. ConE § 35-35-1-2(c) (Supp. 1987). 
168A similar provision is currently in place in FED. R. CRJM. P., Rule ll(h): "Any 
variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not ~ffect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded." To date, the Supreme Court bas not addressed a challenge to the 
validity of this provision although it has been used in matters of direct appeal by lower 
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 465 (4th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. De le Puente, 755 F.2d 313, 314-IS (3d Cir. 1985); but see United States v. 
Ramos. 810 F.2d 308, 312 (1st Cir. 1987) (this circuit may not follow Rule ll(h) when 
defendant moves to withdraw his plea). · 
169468 N.E.2d 1027 (1984). 
170/d. at 1029. 
171White v. State. 497 N.E.2d 893, 897-99 (Ind. 1986). 
112386 u.s. 18 (1967) . 
• 
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. 
formulation of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies assigned to 
protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed 
rights.'' 173 This is not to say the Indiana courts may not find a violation 
of a constitutional · right is harmless error pursuant to the judicially 
formulated Rule 61 of the Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure. 174 That 
• 
ability is specifically reserved in Chapman. 1' 5 H·owever, that case does 
negate subsection 2(c) and denies to the General Assembly the power 
to formulate a rule of its own. Thus, subsection 2(c) can have no legal 
effect on the review of a guilty plea in Indiana, either on collateral 
attack or direct appeal. But can the Indiana courts still find ''harmless 
error'' on direct ·appeal? 
Because McCarthy v. United States176 was not decided on consti-
tutional grounds but on rules of statutory construction, the answer to 
that question has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court. However, 
the very nature of a direct appeal is going to make it extremely difficult 
to find harmless error because review is confined to the guilty plea 
record. Thus, almost any omission from the statutes is error for lack 
of evidence otherwise. The defendant has no burden to produce anything 
but the record. Realistically, a challenge to the ever thorny failure to 
advise of the minimum or maximum sentences will be naught if the 
defendant was sentenced within the parameters of the possible sentences, 
as in White, Such failure will probably still be deemed harmless error 
pursuant to Rule 61. Except for being within the general due process 
considerations regarding an advisement of the consequences of a plea, 
this advisement is not otherwise supported by an independent consti-
tutional right. So, unless the Indiana Supreme Court changes its mode 
of review drastically in the near future, it is hardly likely it will follow 
McCarthy's method of statutory construction to require strict adherence 
to the statute on this particular element, even on direct appeal. All the 
other elements, however, have been specifically denominated to be of 
federal dimension and not omissible in such instance. 177 Thus, the Indiana 
Supreme Court will have to re-examine some of its current practices 
applicable to collateral attack when faced with a direct appeal. 
C. Retroactive Application 
One of the major questions arising from White is whether its standard 
should be applied retroactively, that is, to all reviews of guilty pleas 
113/d. at 21. 
174IND. R. CIV. P. 61. 
175386 U.S. at 21-22. 
176394 u.s. 459 (1969). 
177See supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text. 
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without regard to when they were entered. The White court hinted at 
the answer to this question in its disposition of Randy White's petition: 
''If appellant has any other basis upon which to establish that his plea 
was not voluntary and intelligent, he may file a new petition.'' 178 Similar 
notations were rnade in subsequent cases decided by the Indiana Supreme 
Court. 179 
Patton v. State, 180 an Indiana Court of Appeals case, was the first 
to confront the problem of retroactivity. Patton's appellate brief reached 
the court after the White decision, and in it he argued that White should 
be limited to a prospective application only. The court of appeals dis-
agreed, providing, however, only the rationale noted above: the White 
standard was applied to Randy White's petition.t81 This stands, the court 
concluded, as precedent for the proposition that White has been given 
retroactive effect. The court determined that White was to be applied 
retroactively, despite the fact that the White court did not elucidate the 
reasons for retroactivity. The Patton court went no further in its ex-
plication of the problem. 182 
Even though the precedent for retroactivity has been established, 
inquiry into the question remains fruitful, particularly given that the 
Patton decision does not address the precise contours of the argument 
which may be made. 
The prior case of German v. State 183 was given prospective application 
only. The supreme court, in Martin v. State, 184 held that "there is no 
sound reason for retroactive application of German.'' 185 The decision to 
apply German prospectively should shed some light on the rationale 
behind the decision to apply White retroactively. 
It should be noted that, as a general matter, constitutional prohi-
bitions against ex post facto laws do not apply to judicial precedent. 
The focus of ex post facto prohibitions is upon the legislature and the 
178White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893, 906 (Ind. 1986). 
119E.g., Simpson v. State, 499 N .E.2d 205, 206 (Ind. 1986); Reid v. State, 499 N .E.2d 
207, 208 (Ind. 1986); Merriweather v. State, 209, 211 (Ind. 1986). 
180507 N.E.2d 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
181/d. at 626. 
112/d.; see also Buskirk v. State, 511 N .E.2d 305 (Ind. 1987). Although the Buskirk 
case occurred outside the survey period, it is noteworthy because Justice Pivarnik's opinion 
held White to be retroactive. Unfortunately, Buskirk cited Patton as precedent. /d. at 
· 305. The Patton court stated, ''Explication of the policy and its constitutional ramifications 
is best left to the highest court of our state." 507 N.E.2d at 626. 
183428 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. 1981). 
114480 N.E.2d 543 (Ind. 1985) (clarifying conflict between Johnson v. State, 471 
N.E.2d 1107 (Ind. 1984) and William v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1036 (Ind. 1984)). 
11
'Martin, 480 N.E.2d at 547. 
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desire to limit its authority. 186 The litigant seeking to compel, as with 
the German standard, or avoid, as with the White standard, retroactivity 
• 
is thus left to a common law,. or perhaps due process, approach to the 
issue. The latter analysis usually employs three factors, none of which 
apparently predominate. They are: (a) the purpose to be served by the 
new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities 
on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of Justice 
of a retroactive application of the new standards .. 187 
. . 
The purpose of German's requirement of strict compliance with the 
statute relating to guilty pleas was two-fold. It was designed to insure 
. . 
proper advice to the pleader and create ease of appellate review . 188 German 
did not affect the fact-finding process. White, on the other hand, does 
affect the fact-finding process intimately. The ultimate fact to be found 
in a post-conviction proceeding for review of a guilty plea is whether 
the plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently .189 White 
directly bears upon this issue. White asked, would the petitioner have 
pleaded guilty if the omitted advisement had been given? 190 A finding 
of a potential change in plea is highly probative on the issue of whether 
th_e plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently. Thus, the purpose to 
be served by the new standards is to reflect accurately the voluntariness 
of the plea. The purpose of the White standard, therefore, is to serve 
as a more accurate barometer of the correct result. That is, was the 
guilty plea accepted correctly? This purpose militates strongly in favor 
of a retroactive application. Standards which bear upon the fact-finding 
process should generally be applied uniformly and retroactively. 191 
However, under the foregoing, unfairness can and probably did 
result to petitioners in a position such as White. This is a component 
of the second portion of the analysis, the factor of the degree of reliance 
by petitioners. Usually, the test applied is whether there was reliance 
by law enforcement officials, especially in the area of search and seizure 
law. However, Judge Shields in Bryant v. State192 aptly noted that when 
the rule (or ·standard) under consideration is more restrictive in nature, 
the analysis more germane is the degree of the reliance by defendants 
(or petitioners). 
186See Sumpter v. State, 264 Ind. 117, 340 N .E.2d 764, cert. denied. 425 U.S. 952 
(1976). 
187Bryant v. State, 446 N.E.2d 364, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)). See generally Rowley v. State, 483 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind. 1985). 
188Martin, 480 N.E.2d at 547. 
189See supra notes 89 and accompanying text. 
190497 N .E.2d at 906. 
191See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969). 
19244.6 N.E.2d 364, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 
• 
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Randy White's brief, and those in other cases which follow closely 
~he White decision, demonstrate the degree of petitioners' reliance. White 
did resist transfer on the ground that the issue of reexamination of the 
standard of German and Austin was not appropriately before the Indiana 
Supreme Court. Yet White seemed to argue only that German and Austin 
mandated vacation of his plea. 193 Thus, the degree of reliance was 
substantial. Moreover, the new rule, while having its basis in prior case 
law, is a radical and abrupt departure from immediate prior precedent. 
German and Austin were overruled by name and in full. 
White does seek to ameliorate the harshness that the abrupt change 
caused. Randy White was given, somewhat cryptically, a second chance 
to vindicate his position. The disposition does give White the opportunity 
to refile his petition, provided he has "any other basis upon which to 
establish that his plea was not voluntary and intelligent.'' 194 The extent 
to which this gives White the chance to relitigate the voluntariness of 
his plea, particularly concerning the issues which he raised in his first 
appeal, is problematic. As Patton noted, there are pitfalls in relitigation, 
not the least of which are waiver and estoppel. 195 Nevertheless, Randy 
White was given the chance to at least reopen his case despite the 
problems which reopening may create. 
The third component of the retroactivity analysis is that of the 
burden on the administration of justice. The White court viewed the 
overturning of guilty pleas as an inordinate burden to the system. The 
court wrote: 
Routine reversal of convictions on technical grounds imposes 
substantial costs on society. Chief Justice Designate Rehnquist 
recently enumerated these costs, and we paraphrase his descrip-
tion of them. Jurors, witnesses, judges, lawyers, and prosecutors 
may be required to commit further time and other resources to 
repeat a trial which has already taken place. The victims are 
caused to relive frequently painful experience in open court. The 
erosion of memory and the dispersal of witnesses may well make 
a new trial difficult or even impossible. If the latter is the case, 
an admitted perpetrator will be rewarded with freedom from 
prosecution. Such results prejudice society's interest in the prompt 
administration of justice, reduce the deterrent value of any pun-
193 White, 497 N.E.2d at 895. 
194/d. at 906 (emphasis added). 
1951n Patton, the petitioner argued that, beyond waiver and estoppel, he might be 
subject to an increased sentence under the revised rules. Patton's argument made in the 
context of requesting a remand for the purpose of meeting the White stand~rd, was 
reje.cted. 507 N.E.2d 624, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) . 
• 
• 
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ishment, and hamper the rehabilitation of wrongdoers. 196 
Fortunately, the court which created German and Austin concurred 
in this assessment. In limiting German to prospective application only, 
the court wrote in Martin v. State: 
Retroactive application could only result in the vacatipg of many 
judgments resting upon guilty pleas actually given knowingly and 
voluntarily or if not so given, nevertheless, given under circum-
stances rendering deficiency in the advisements harmless error. 
The burden upon the administration of justice in such cases is 
overwhelming. 197 
Thus, even though the Martin and White courts disagreed as to the 
result to be reached regarding prospective and retrospective application 
of the respective standards, both agreed in their assessment of the burden 
to the administration of justice with regard to the standard. 
The traditional analysis of retroactive application of precedent there-· 
fore suggests that White be given full retroactive effect. White bears 
upon the ultimate issue of the correctness of a guilty plea, seeks to limit 
by its own terms the harshness of overturning German and Austin, and 
will work a reduction, in the long run, of vacation of guilty pleas and 
. 
the resultant full criminal litigation. Retroactive application is probably 
the ,correct result, particularly because the White court overruled Austin 
and thus foreclosed any contentions of whether the court's decision 
impairs vested, substantive rights to persons having pleaded guilty under 
the previous standards. 
V. EFFECT oF White oN INDIANA PosT-CoNVICTION PROCEDURE 
As stated earlier, the Indiana Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction 
Remedies are designed to effectuate the following goals: a simple and 
expeditious procedure; a single procedure obviating the need for state 
habeas corpus or corum n.obis proceedings; disposition on the merits of 
the claims whenever possible; and elimination of subsequent post-con-
viction petitions by the same petitioner concerning the same conviction. 198 
One must wonder to what extent the changed standard of review 
announced by White v. State will serve these goals. Two caveats are in 
order. First, White is merely a change in the way in which guilty pleas 
are taken in terms of the requisite advisements. Second, and relatedly, 
White is not procedural. It . does nothing to change the manner of 
196White, 497 N.E.2d at 905. 
191Martin v. State, 480 N.E.2d 543; 547 (Ind. 1985). 
198See supra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
1988] CRIMINAL LAW 113 
• 
processing post-conviction cases .. Nevertheless, White may, as a practical 
matter,. have an impact on the degree to which the post--conviction relief 
rules serve the stated and implicit goals. ' 
First, White's immediate impact is to impose a new threshold tech-
nical requirement with regard to pleading. To be successful, a petitioner 
must allege facts which could, if proven, lead to the conclusion that, 
but for the omitted advisement, the petitioner would not have pleaded 
guilty .199 Though the pleading requirement may be relatively simple, it 
is still a threshold requirement. Inartful or unaware pleaders, particularly 
those appearing pro se, could lose the opportunity to litigate fully their 
claim should they fail to allege both the necessary result and cause. 
That is, the defendant must allege that a plea of guilty would not have 
been entered if the trial court had given its constitutionally required 
advisement. Setting to one side the issue of the propriety of requiring 
such proof, there is little doubt that disposal of claims on pleading 
grounds has become a much greater possibility. This approach appears 
to be in conflict with the stated desire to dispose of claims on their 
• merits. 
Second, White actually in~reases, rather than decreases, the prob-
ability of subsequent petitions concerning the same guilty plea. As noted, 
the standard for guilty pleas has changed five times in less than ten 
years.200 While the reality may differ from the perception, the perception 
must be that a second petition for post-conviction relief gives at least 
some opportunity for .further review under a new and different standard. 
The White case itself demonstrates this. Randy White was given, in the 
court's disposition, a new opportunity to allege and prove facts which 
would meet the standard. 201 Thus, White's case results in two trial court 
decisions and inevitable appellate court reviews. This result was extended 
to all cases in which trial court disposition had not yet occurred when 
White was handed down.202 It may fairly extend to all potential litigants 
seeking a ''second bite at the apple'' under a new standard, regardless 
of whether that standard actually increases the chances of success (which 
199White, 497 N.E.2d at 905 ("[The petitioner] needs to plead specific facts from 
which a finder of fact could conclude .... ~, (emphasis added)). 
200See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
101 White, 497 N.E.2d at 906. 
202E.g., Simpson v. State, 499 N .E.2d 205, 206 (Ind. 1986); Reid v. State, 499 N .E.2d 
207, 208 (Ind. 1986); Merriweather v. State, 499 N.E.2d 209, 211 (Ind. 1986). In all three 
cases, the court wrote: 
We note that appellant''s petition for post-conviction relief and proceedings 
thereon were predicated on case law existing before our recent decision in White 
which reviewed and revised- the applicable burden of pleading and proof. There-
fore, if appellant has any other basis upon which to establish that his plea was 
not voluntary and intelligent, he may file a new petition. 
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it does not). As more of the issues raised by White become settled, 
litigation may decrease. Yet, at present, there can be little doubt that 
more, not less, litigation is the immediate result of White. Certainly 
there is no empirical evidence to suggest that post- White pleaders will 
• • 
be deterred from pursuing any available post-conviction relief. 
Finally, the White standard begs for full factual litigation., Assuming 
' . 
that a petitioner has shown an omitted advisement, the trial court's. work 
is not done as it was under German/ Austin. 203 The court must still 
inquire as to whether the petitioner's plea would have reasonably changed., 
Further, assuming that the petitioner would testify in the affirmative in 
this regard, it is then incumbent upon the State to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of the position that the petitioner would not have changed 
the plea.. T,his evidence, in the nature of rebuttal evidence, must be 
objective in nature and will probably center on the facts and circumstances 
of the plea agreement, the petitioner's prior involvement, if any, with 
the criminal justice system,204 and the strength of the proof of the crime 
itself. None seems necessarily amenable to summary factual determi-
nation, and could lead to virtually a full trial on the crime charged. 
Though one must keep in mind the desire to provide for disposition on 
the merits, that goal of post-conviction relief statutes is not necessarily 
served by increasing the factual determinations needed for ultimate res-
olution. Increasing the litigable fact questions may also be a disservice 
to the goal of an expeditious ·procedure. 
In summary, White does have· an impact upon the post-conviction 
procedure as a whole, despite the fact that it is only changing the 
standard of appellate review. It imposes an additional pleading .and proof 
requirement upon petitioners, causes an increase (at least for the present) 
. . 
in the number of post-conviction relief decisions which must be made 
and also opens up the possibility of much more involved factual de-
terminations. 205 
203 See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text. 
lOt'See Burns v. State, 500 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. 1986) (correct advisement in previous 
guilty plea hearing cured error of omitted advisement in case under review). 
wsone other effect of White upon the post-conviction process should be noted. In 
three cases in the survey period, appellate courts held that denial of post .. conviction relief 
in a summary fashion was inappropriate when a public defender has been .appointed to 
represent a petitioner but has not yet amended the pro se petition. Holliness v. State, 
496 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. 1986); Stoner v. State, 506 N.E.2d 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); 
Colvin v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). As noted in Stoner, ~'The rationale 
is a pro se petitioner seeking post-conviction relief is given leave to amend his petition 
as a matter of right by Indiana Rule of Post-Conviction Relief 1, § 4(c)!' 506 N.E.2d 
at 838. · 
Under White, the court may look to the entire record to ascertain whether the plea 
was correctly accepted. 497 N .E.2d 893, 905. In determining if a petitioner would not 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
White is susceptible to attack on numerous grounds, not the least 
of which is that it represents yet another change in guilty plea review. 
Beyond the difficulties of this fifth change in ten years which White 
creates, the case rests on faulty precedent and an ineffective refutation 
of Ailstin and German. 
Nevertheless, White is the latest pronouncement in the area, and 
petitioners seeking to obtain relief under the White standard are left 
too little in the way of novel argument, and less in the way of meeting 
the standard itself. Post-conviction petitioners will likely be able to make 
gains only in the Boykin rights area, such as with Henderson, or in the 
area of pursuing a direct appeal. If this is truly the case, then one must 
hope that with these limited avenues for relief, the Indiana Supreme 
Court will, at minimum, leave White in place longer than its predecessors 
so that petitioners may pursue federally based rights without concern 
for vacillating state standards. 
have pleaded guilty, the court may look objectively at the record. See Granger v. State, 
499 N.E.2d 743, 745 (Ind. 1986). These two items, when coupled with the post-conviction 
court's authority for summary disposition of the petitioner under Rule 1, § 4(f) of Indiana 
Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction (Remedies), may cause an increase in the number 
of summary dispositions without action by the public defender's office because under 
White, the record alone may be a sufficient basis upon which to deny relief. The holdings 
of the three cases above may be, therefore, subject to new scrutiny and clarification in 
light of White . 
• 
